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JUDICIAL HIGHLIGHT
PENNSYLVANIA PROPERTY CASES OF 1959
By WILLIAM H. DODD,* Assisted by Robert D. Myers, Robert B. Surrick,
Thomas D. Nabors, Jr.
REVERSIONARY INTERESTS

In re Reichard's Petition ' presented the superior court with the question
of whether the appurtenance clause in a deed conveying part of a tract of land
is effective in conveying a reversionary interest in another part of the tract. In
1893 a husband and wife conveyed part of their land to a school district, reserving unto themselves, their heirs and assigns, a reversionary interest in the event
the land was ever abandoned for school purposes. In 1951 the school district
acquired a fee simple in the land under section 2 of the Act of 1937,' and in
1955 sold it. Petitioners claimed part of the proceeds under section 3 3 of the
act, asserting that they were successors in title to part of the original tract.
They argued that since the appurtenance clause in all the deeds in their chain
of title included the words "reversion and reversions," the reversionary interest
in the school property passed to them. The court held that the words in the
appurtenance clause referred only to the reversions in the premises conveyed
and did not effect a conveyance of any interest in other land. Although the
court did not discuss it, the case could possibly have been decided on another
ground. Petitioners did not acquire ownership of the land until after the school
district had obtained a fee in the school property. Consequently, it would
appear that they had no standing to bring an action.
The same Act of 1937 was involved in Long v. Monongahela City School
Dist.4 In that case a school district had obtained a base fee in land of plaintiff's
ancestor. In 1955 the school district acquired a fee simple title to the land
under section 2 of the above act. Plaintiff, owner of the reversionary interest,
instituted a suit in ejectment against the school district, claiming that the title
to the property had reverted to him because the school district abandoned the
property by non-user prior to 1955. The supreme court adopted the opinion
* B.A., Dickinson College; LL.B., Dickinson School of Law; Professor of Law, Dickinson
School of Law.
1 188 Pa. Super. 130, 146 A.2d 71 (1958).
2 PA. STAT. ANN.tit.53, § 1172 (1937).

aPA. STAT. ANN. tit.53, §

1173 (1937).
4 395 Pa. 618, 151 A.2d 461 (1959).
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of the lower court which held that under the Act of 1949 5 school property is
not deemed abandoned until a resolution to that effect is adopted by the board
of school directors. Since plaintiff did not aver the adoption of any such resolution his complaint did not state a cause of action. The court went on to state
that when a school district proceeds without challenge to acquire a fee simple
title under the Act of 1937, owners of a reversionary interest cannot recover in
an action of ejectment but must proceed under section 3 of the act.

LIFE ESTATES

In Bowman v. Brown 6 the supreme court was asked to decide whether a
testator intended to devise a fee simple or a life estate. Testator died in 1931,
survived by a wife and four children, two by a prior marriage and two by his
present marriage. His will gave all his real and personal property to his wife
"as long as she sees fit to remain on the premises and keep said premises in
repair and pay taxes on same." The will also provided that in case the wife
predeceased him, the estate should be divided equally among his four children.
The widow fulfilled the conditions of the devise and died intestate in 1955,
survived by the two children she had by testator and two she had by a prior
marriage. The two children of testator's prior marriage had predeceased her,
but their heirs contended that testator's will had given the widow only a life
estate and that, therefore, they were entitled to a share of the property. The
widow's children asserted that the devise was a fee simple estate. The court
held that when a devise of realty is made with conditions attached there is an
indication that the devisor did not intend to give an absolute title. Ownership
of property which is conditioned upon living on the premises and paying the
taxes hangs on too slender a thread to be consonant with a fee simple estate.
Consequently, it must be a life estate and the fact that there is no gift over is
immaterial. Testator is presumed to have intended a result that would not
disinherit his own flesh and blood in favor of benefiiting others.

CLASS GIFTS

In re Trattner's Estate concerned the construction of a will which provided: "To any grandniece or nephew born after the execution of this will,
one-half (1/2) part of the residue, until three (3) parts are consumed." No
persons answering this description were born between the date of execution of
5

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 7-708 (1949).

6 394 Pa. 647, 149 A.2d 56 (1959).
7

394 Pa. 133, 145 A.2d 678 (1958).
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the will and the date of testatrix's death. Subsequent to her death three grandnieces and three grandnephews were born and a grandniece and a grandnephew
adopted. Of these, two grandnieces were born within one year of testatrix's
death. The rest were born or adopted after that time. The court held that testatrix intended to make a class gift and intended the class to close upon her
death. Consequently, only those persons born subsequent to the execution of
the will and prior to the date of death were entitled to share. The court then
held that persons en ventre sa mere are considered "born" for inheritance purposes and that the two grandnieces born within one year after testatrix's death
are the only ones within the class of takers.
A similar problem was presented in In re Metzgar's Estate.' Testator
executed a will in 1914, giving all his estate to his wife for her life and "from
and after her death to my brothers and sisters then living share and share alike."
The wife died in 1936, survived by testator and two sisters of testator. Testator
died in 1955 survived by only one sister, to whom distribution of the entire estate
was proposed to be made. The sole heir of the other sister who survived testator's wife excepted and was upheld by the lower court. The supreme court, in
affirming, held that testator intended to make a class gift to those of his brothers
and sisters who survived the life tenant. Since this intention was clear, the rules
of construction in section 14(4) of the Wills Act ' were held inapplicable. The
fact that testator may have anticipated another result and the fact that the will
lay unchanged for nineteen years after the life tenant's death are immaterial.
The testator in In re Dickson's Estate 10 devised one-half of the residue of
his estate in trust for his son, Arthur, for life with remainder to his issue. In
the event Arthur died without issue surviving, the fund was to be assigned and
transferred to the nieces of testator's wife living "at the time of my death." At
testator's death seven nieces were living. Arthur died childless in 1957 survived
by two of the nieces. His executor claimed five-sevenths of the principal of the
trust on the ground that an intestacy had occurred because five of the seven nieces
had predeceased Arthur. The supreme court held that the class of nieces became
ascertained at the time of testator's death. Although their interests were contingent on Arthur's dying without issue surviving, they were transmissible and
became vested at Arthur's death. In answer to an argument that the "pay and
divide" rule be applied, the court said that the rule is henceforth to be taken
as abolished.
8 395 Pa. 322,

148 A.2d 895 (1959).

" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14 (1947).

10 396 Pa. 371, 152 A.2d 680 (1959).
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POWERS

In re Jeffer's Estate " concerned the exercise of a special power of appointment. Decedent was the donee of a general power of appointment under her
father's will. In 1949 she released the power, except to appoint to descendants
of her father and their spouses and to public, religious or charitable institutions.
In her will, decedent did not mention the power but gave her residuary estate in
trust for a named charity. The lower court 12 recognized that the law " permits a
general devise of the residue to operate as an exercise of a general power of
appointment. It then held that the partial release of the power limited only the
class of appointees but did not limit the manner in which the power could be
exercised. The supreme court held that the partial release limited both the class
of appointees and the manner of exercising the power. It then held that a general devise of the residue will not effect an exercise of a limited power unless
the power is specifically mentioned or unless the residuary devisees include all the
persons coming within the limited class of appointees. Since the charity named
in decedent's will was only one of the possible appointees, the devise did not
constitute an exercise of the power.

TESTAMENTARY CONVEYANCES

In re Henderson'sEstate 14 involved a widow's election against the transfer
of insurance policies on the life of her husband. During the 1920's the husband
had taken out three policies of life insurance on his life, payable to the wife,
but reserving the power to change the beneficiaries. In 1952 he made two of
the policies payable to persons other than the wife. During the same year he
created an unfunded revocable insurance trust, and, after making the third policy
of life insurance payable to the trustee, he delivered the policy as the only asset
of the trust. The wife was not named as cestui. The dispositive provisions of
the trust were amended in 1953 and 1957. Upon the husband's death the wife
elected to take against the will and to treat the transfers of the insurance as
testamentary conveyances. She asserted that by virtue of section 11 of the
Estates Act ",she had acquired a vested interest in the insurance policies which
could not be divested by the 1956 amendment to that section "6or the 1957
amendment to section 8 17 of the act. The supreme court held as to the first two
policies that prior to 1948 a widow had no interest in insurance on her husband's
11 394 Pa. 393, 147 A.2d 402 (1959).
12 71 Pa. York L.R. 65 (1951).
13PA.
14

STAT. ANN. tit. 20,

§

180.14(14)

§
§

301.11 (1950).
301.7a (1957).

(1947).

395 Pa. 215, 149 A.2d 892 (1959).
15PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (1947).
6
1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
17 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
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life which was payable to a third person, that despite the somewhat ambiguous
langauge of section 11 of the Estates Act the legislature did not thereby intend
to give a widow any such interest, and that the 1956 and 1957 amendments were
merely in clarification of prior existing law. As to the policy conveyed in trust,
the court held that it was a "conveyance of assets" within the meaning of section
11 of the Estates Act and would have entitled the wife to elect against it except
for the amendments of 1956 and 1957 and the change in the trust made by her
husband after these amendments. The rights of the surviving spouse were held
to be determined at the time of her husband's death, and since at that time the
legislature had denied her the right to elect against a conveyance of insurance
policies, she could not do so.
The testamentary character of a trust was the subject of In re Mason's
Estate.18 In 1950, Mason created a trust consisting of four parcels of realty.
The trustee was to manage the property and pay the net income to Mason during
his life, and after his death to distribute it in a manner not pertinent here. Mason
reserved the power to alter, amend, revoke, consume part or all of the principal,
and limited power to control actions of the trustee. In 1953 Mason executed a
will in which he gave specific realty to appellant, an employee, and certain other
parties. In 1955 Mason conveyed this realty to the trustee to become part of the
trust corpus. Upon Mason's death appellant contended that the trust was testamentary and void. The supreme court held that a conveyance of assets in trust,
creating present interests in the beneficiaries and imposing active duties upon
the trustee, is a valid inter vivos trust even though the settlor retains a beneficial
life estate together with the power to alter, amend or revoke in whole or in part.
The fact that the enjoyment of the other beneficiaries of the trust was postponed
until settlor's death is immaterial since settlor intended to and did part with
legal title.
MYERS.
ZONING

Mandamus and Enforcement of Zoning Ordinance
Where the issuance of a permit is a mere ministerial duty, permitting no
discretion, it may be enforced by an action of mandamus.1" This general rule
was followed in Doyle v. Springfield Township Bd. of Comm'rs,2 ° where a build.
ing inspector refused to issue a permit of occupancy for a restaurant with a liquor
license. The court held that the proposed transfer of a liquor license was a
matter within the jurisdiction of the Liquor Control Board and not within the
18 395 Pa. 485, 150 A.2d 542 (1959).
19 Lened Homes v. Phila. Dept. of Licenses and Inspection, 386 Pa. 50, 123 A.2d 406 (1956).
20 349 Pa. 49, 145 A.2d 695 (1959).
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purview of the zoning board. Justice Bell concurred, adding that mandamus
will lie where interpretation of a building code is in issue. The Doyle case was
followed in Dively v. Tanner 21 where mandamus was held the proper remedy
to force issuance of a plumbing permit for expansion of a non-conforming use.
Again, mandamus was held proper in Borough of Baldwin, Alleg. Co. v.
Matthews,22 where the zoning board refused to issue a building permit although
the proposed building satisfied the zoning ordinance. The board's refusal was
based upon possible danger of fire in old mine workings caused by the proposed
excavation. Since the applicant had met the zoning requirements, the court
ruled that mandamus was the proper remedy, even though the board had utilized
its expertise in deciding that issuance was detrimental to public safety.
Mandamus was denied in Riccardiv. Bd. of Adjustment of Plymouth Township,23 where a resident sought to enforce the zoning regulations. The court
held that the zoning ordinance contained a built-in remedy in the form of a fine
and the extraordinary writ of mandamus would not lie.
An interesting enforcement aspect was involved in City of Phila. v. Budney, where the city brought an equity action to enjoin the defendant from
violating the zoning ordinance and maintaining a nuisance. The defendant
pleaded the defense of a non-conforming use. He had previously been denied
a permit on the alternative theories of variance or non-conforming use by the
board of adjustment, whose action was affirmed by the court of common pleas.
The supreme court upheld the lower court's refusal to receive evidence of a nonconforming use on the ground that "the legislature has provided that zoning
matters are to be heard exclusively by administrative tribunals which are created
for that express purpose.25 In effect, the court ruled that the prior action was
res judicata in this equity action.
24

Construction of Zoning Ordinance
The court, in reviewing the decision of the zoning board will concern itself
entirely with the question of an abuse of discretion by the board.2 6 This rule
was followed in Boreth v. Phila. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,27 where the board
had refused to issue a use registration permit to appellant to operate a beauty
shop in her basement within an area zoned residential. A beauty shop was not
189 Pa. Super. 635, 151 A.2d 665 (1959).
394 Pa. 57, 145 A.2d 698 (1959).
23 Riccardi v. Bd. of Adjustment of Plymouth Township, 394 Pa. 624, 149 A.2d 50.
24396 Pa. 87, 151 A.2d 780 (1959).
25 1d. at 88, 151 A.2d at 781.
26
Appeal of Kupina, 396 Pa. 109, 151 A.2d 625 (1959).
F7 396 Pa. 82, 151 A.2d 474 (1959),

21
22
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listed as a permitted use under the regulations. Appellant contended that a
beauty shop was a "home occupation," which was permitted by the ordinance.
The supreme court followed Gold v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 8 a case with
similar facts, which held that a home occupation must be of the type incidental
to and customarily conducted in the home. Therefore, the board did not abuse
its discretion in refusing the permit.
The zoning board was upheld in Tidewater Oil Co. v. F. S. Poore " when
it refused to change zoning after Tidewater Oil had purchased the land, even
though the area was a peninsula of farm land in a heavily industrialized area.
The supreme court, in reversing the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas,
stated that the function of the court was to prevent abuse of discretion, not to
rezone, and as no abuse of discretion was shown, the decision of the zoning
board must be final.
In Van Sciver v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment 80 appellant applied for a registration permit to install a laundromat. The zoning board granted the permit
with conditions attached. On appeal the supreme court interpreted the zoning
ordinance and decided the appellant was entitled to the permit under the existing
regulations. Therefore, the conditions could not be attached unless on the basis
of health, public welfare, and safety. Justice McBride further stated that the
board could not base these conditions on health, safety, and public welfare as
"the zoning board must base its findings of fact from evidence in the record
only" 1 and there was no evidence of this type to be found on the record. Prior
to the Van Sciver case the supreme court in Fifty-fourth St. Center v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment 82 had discussed the applicability of attaching conditions to the
issuance of permits or certificates as opposed to the attaching of conditions to
the granting of variances and concluded that conditions on certificates were a
valid exercise of police power. It appears that in the Fifty-fourth St. case the
board based its decision on administrative expertise. It was not held to be
arbitrary or unreasonable to base findings on evidence not of record when affirmed by the supreme court.

Variances and Exceptions
Before a variance may be granted by the board it must be shown that the
circumstances that affect the land are unique and applicable to that land alone
28
28
30
31
82

Gold v.
395 Pa.
396 Pa.
Id. at 395 Pa.

Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 401, 143 A.2d 59 (1958).
89, 149 A.2d 646 (1959).
646, 152 A.2d 717 (1959).
, 152 A.2d at 722.
338, 150 A.2d 335 (1959).
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and are not conditions that affect the whole neighborhood. Only a hardship peculiar to the applicant's property merits the allowance of a variance. If there is a
general hardship, the situation should be remedied by a revision of the general
zoning regulation, not by the grant of a special privilege to single owners."
In 1959 the supreme court refused variances in the following cases:
(1) Where applicant sought a variance to make a two family dwelling
into a three family dwelling and to replace a legally existing wooden addition
with a stone structure, the variance was refused by the board on the basis of the
lack of a side yard (10' 6" v. the required 14') and an open court (8' v. the
required 14'). Since there were at least four other multiple dwellings on the
block, appellant contended a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance would be an unnecessary hardship. The supreme court upheld the board
stating that the applicant had failed to show unnecessary hardship and even if
the zoning regulationswere no longer adequate, the properremedy is a complete
rezoning of the area, not by rezoning piecemeal with variances.4 This case was
followed in English v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the Borough of Norristown,3 5 where Justice Cohen stated "this need of rezoning does not permit the
grant of a variance to a single property." "6
Where applicant desired a variance for enclosing his front porch to
improve the physical condition of his wife and son who suffered from asthma
and a severe respiratory ailment respectively, the zoning board refused to allow
the requested 31/2 foot encroachment on the 30 foot setback requirement. The
Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County reversed and the board appealed. The supreme court, upholding the board, reiterated the position that
the hardship must be peculiarto the property and the hardship on the applicant's
physical condition will not suffice to grant a variance.'
(2)

(3) Where a grange society purchased land, formerly a church, to be used
as a meeting house in an area zoned residential, excluding club or fraternity
houses, the board refused to grant a variance in the face of evidence that property, if not used for this purpose, was practically worthless. The supreme court,
in upholding the board's refusal, agreed the hardship was without merit as the
grange had purchased the land with actual or constructive knowledge of the zoning ordinance, therefore, the injury was self-inflicted."'
3
3Michener
34

Appeal, 382 Pa. 401, 115 A.2d 367 (1955).
Spadaro v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 394 Pa. 375, 147 A.2d 159 (1959).
35 395 Pa. 118, 148 A.2d 912 (1959).
301d. at 119, 148 A.2d 914.
37 In re Klines Estate, 394 Pa. 645, 148 A.2d 916 (1959).
38 Appeal of Upper St. Clair Township Grange, 397 Pa., 152 A.2d 768 (1959).
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The supreme court granted variances in the following cases:
(1) Where applicant desired to build an extension on an apartment house
already non-conforming in both use and dimension, the supreme court affirmed
the zoning board's grant of a variance while on the facts it appears to be an
extension of a non-conforming use. The court further stated that the record
clearly showed unique and undue hardship to the property unless the use was
permitted. Justices Bell and Cohen dissented."
(2) Where appellee, desiring to erect a gas station on land zoned residential, introduced evidence that the land was virtually worthless as zoned, the
zoning board granted the variance and the supreme court affirmed on the grounds
that the zoning ordinance would make the residents "land poor" due to the
decreased value of their property.4 ° The facts do not reveal the character of
the neighborhood. In this case the court seems to be saying that a small decrease
in value is not enough to warrant a variance, but if the land as zoned is virtually
worthless, a variance will be in order. This makes it difficult to determine
when a property has decreased enough in value to merit a variance, and does
violence to the supreme court's prior statements such as, "This court has repeatedly held that where all that is shown is that the hardship is economic alone,
a variance cannot be granted." 41 It also seems to violate the general rule concerning piecemeal zoning by the use of variances where the need for rezoning
is shown.
In Koizin v. Plymouth Township Bd. of Adjustment 42 the supreme court
upheld the zoning board's refusal to grant an exception for the opening of a
non-commercial swimming club. The court upheld the board on the ground
that even though the zoning ordinance listed this type of operation as a possible
exception, the grounds of public health, safety and morals were sufficient reason
for denial and not such an abuse of discretion as to warrant reversal.

Expansion of Non-conforming Use
In Bennett v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment " the zoning board ruled on an
action brought by neighbors that defendant violated the zoning ordinance in
expanding his non-conforming use gas station into the business of rental of
trailers. The supreme court affirmed, holding that rental of trailers was not
incidental to the selling of gasoline.
39 In re Grubbs Appeal, 395 Pa. 619, 151 A.2d 599 (1959).

40 Ferry v. Kownads, 396 Pa. 283, 152 A.2d 456 (1959).

Spadaro
Power, 376 Pa.
42 395 Pa.
43 396 Pa.
41

v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 394 Pa. 375, 147 A.2d 159 (1959);
175, 101 A.2d 914 (1954).
125, 149 A.2d 116 (1959).
57, 151 A.2d 439 (1959).

Pincus v.
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An expansion of a non-conforming use was granted in Appeal of Klein,"
where appellant constructed a greenhouse after obtaining a permit. The property was zoned residential but a use of the premises for "farm" purposes was
permitted. After operation of the greenhouse began the zoning ordinance was:
modified to delete the "farm" use. The zoning board revoked appellant's license, the court of common pleas reversed, and the supreme court affirmed the
lower court, holding a valid non-conforming use and also stating that in the right
to grow flowers was inherent the right to sell flowers.
The right to attach conditions to the expansion of a non-conforming use
was upheld in Everson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Allentown,4 5 where
applicant desired to expand his business area onto land held by applicant at time
of ordinance. The supreme court held that the conditions requiring paving of a
dirt parking lot and the planting of trees were a valid exercise of police power
in promoting public health, safety and morals.

PRESCRIPTIVE

EASEMENTS

In Stevenson v. Williams "6a suit to enjoin defendant from building a carport on what had been a common driveway, the undisputed facts showed that
defendant's property line covered seven-twelfths of the driveway and plaintiff's
property line covered the other five-twelfths. Plaintiff based his plea for an
injunction on an easement by prescription, stating that his use of the driveway
since 1944, tacked on to his predecessor's use satisfied the requirement of twentyone years as an adverse user. Defendant pleaded a permissive use. The superior
court, Judge Gunther speaking, held the use to be permissive and denied the
injunction. The court based its decision on testimony of plaintiff's predecessors,
who stated that "everything was all right" and that the use of the driveway was
amicable, although permission by defendant was never shown. This case seems
contrary to the general rules applicable to an adverse user in that after plaintiff
pleads an easement by prescription and shows a user for over 21 years the burden
is on the defendant to establish the permissive use. The fact that the defendant
said nothing to the adverse user will not make it permissive. This general rule
is reaffirmed in Steel v. Yocum " where the court stated, "[T]he burden is on
the owners to show that the easement is used under permission or contract, not
consistent with an adverse use." " It should be noted in the Stevenson case,
44 395 Pa. 157, 149 A.2d 114 (1959).
45 395 Pa. 168, 149 A.2d 63 (1959).
40 188 Pa. Super. 49, 145 A.2d 734 (1959).
47 189 Pa. Super. 522, 151 A.2d 815 (1959).
48 EIias v. Scott, 164 Pa. Super 329, 334, 64 A.2d 508, 510 (1949).
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where the crucial issue was the affirmative defense of permission, that the superior court reversed the common pleas court.
DiVirgilio v. Ettore 49 was an action to enjoin alleged encroachment on an
alley. The facts show that one-half of the three foot alley was on defendant's
land next to his fence. When defendant discovered this fact, he moved his fence
eighteen inches to the place where it should have been originally in accordance
with his deed. Plaintiff, who owned land on the opposite side of the alley,
brought this action to enjoin the movement. The superior court held that plaintiff
had acquired a prescriptive easement over the portion of the alley on defendant's
land. In reaching this decision, the court stated: "[W]here one uses an easement whenever he sees fit, without asking leave and without objection, the use
is adverse and by such an uninterrupted adverse enjoyment for twenty-one years,
the user acquires a title by prescription." 50

SURFACE WATER

Pennsylvania cases long have held that an owner of land has a right that
surface water shall drain from his land through natural channels upon the land
of a lower owner." They have also recognized that reasonably necessary increases in the quantity of water flowing upon the lower land, which result from
the natural and reasonable use and development of the upper tract, are within the
scope of this right of drainage, provided the water is not collected and drained
through an artificial channel.52 In Westbury Realty Corp. v. LancasterShopping
Center, Inc. 3 plaintiff sought to enjoin defendants from discharging surface
water upon its land and to require them to provide a system of disposal of such
water. The complaint alleged that defendants had erected a rural shopping
center and macadamized an area of seventeen acres, which prevented natural
seepage of surface water into the soil. This substantially increased the flow
upon the lower land of the plaintiff. There was no averment that defendants
were negligent nor that they had collected the water and discharged it through
an artificial channel. The lower court sustained preliminary objections in the
nature of a demurrer, and the supreme court, one member dissenting, reversed.
The majority said that such large shopping areas as this were not contemplated
when concepts of water flow were developed, and that they required "new attitudes both on behalf of the developers as well as the court." The court indicated
49 188 Pa. Super. 526, 149 A.2d 153 (1959).
50 Id. at 529, 149 A.2d 156.

51 Rau v. Wilden Acres, Inc., 376 Pa. 493, 103 A.2d 422 (1954).
52 Leiper v. Heywood-Hall Constr. Co., 381 Pa. 317, 113 A.2d 148 (1955);
363 Pa. 153, 69 A.2d 114 (1949).
53396 Pa. 383, 152 A.2d 669 (1959).

Lucas v. Ford,
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that the owners of the shopping center should provide drainage so that the increased flow would not be upon plaintiff's land. Plaintiff had alleged this could
be done for $9,600, a sum which, considering the total investment in the shopping center, the majority thought "rather significant."
SURRICK

DEDICATION

In the case of In re Warnock Street "' a dedication of a road bed to the City
of Philadelphia was made by deed. More than sixty-five years elapsed before
the municipality physically opened the street. The court recognized that while
an implied dedication effected by a sale of land with reference to a plat must,
under the Act of 1889, °5 be accepted within twenty-one years, the act had no
application to a dedication expressly made by deed and that mere formal acceptance of the deed by the municipality was sufficient.

TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES AND JOINT TENANCY

In Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser5" plaintiff-husband brought an action
against his wife, from whom he was estranged but not divorced, to enjoin her
from collecting rentals from properties held as tenants by the entireties, to
obtain the appointment of a receiver and to determine the support due his wife.
In reversing the decree dismissing plaintiff's complaint, the court stated that
although each spouse owns the whole and not an equal part in an estate held
by the entireties, the modern rule is that where a husband and wife are separated
but not divorced, and where one of them is in complete enjoyment of the entireties property to the exclusion of the other, an accounting of the property so held
may be ordered and the property or proceeds divided equally between them.
In Bove v. Bove " an action of ejectment was brought to recover title and
the right to possession of an undivided one-half interest in certain tracts of real
estate. Title to the land was in the names of plaintiff's testator and defendant
as husband and wife and purported to create in the two of them an estate in the
subject property "as tenants by the entireties." The persons named in the deed
as husband and wife were, in fact, never married. The court stated that although
the deeds were ineffective to create a tenancy by the entireties, they were not
wholly invalid and a declared intention to own the property as tenants by the
entireties was equivalent to stating that there should be a right of survivorship.
54 189 Pa. Super. 624, 152 A.2d 789 (1959).

" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1961 (1889).
56 396 Pa. 530, 153 A.2d 901 (1959).
57394 Pa. 627, 149 A.2d 67 (1959).
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Hence, a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship was created in the property
and upon testator's death defendant owned the entire estate. The court, citing
Teacher v. Kijurina,58 declared it to be wholly irrelevant that defendant contributed no part of the purchase price for either of the two properties.
The question in Sheridan v. Lucey" was whether an action for partition
of real estate held by joint tenants with the right of survivorship abates upon
the death of the complainant before judgment has been entered by the court.
Complainant's decedent, as a joint owner of certain realty, filed a complaint in
partition and died during the pleading stage of the action. The administrator
was substituted and the trial court, after argument, entered judgment in favor
of the remaining joint tenant. The supreme court, in affirming the 'lower court's
action, stated that a joint tenancy in real estate with the right of survivorship is
severable by an act, voluntary or involuntary, of either of the parties, but the act
must be of sufficient manifestation that the actor is unable to retreat from his
position of creating a severance. The court ruled that pendency of a partition
proceeding, before the issues have been formulated, is such a premature act that
the complainant can elect to continue to judgment or discontinue and thereby
leave the joint tenancy in a status quo. The death of the complainant leaves the
parties where they were at the time of his death.
The court held that the survival of actions provided for in the acts of 1807 40
and 1949 "' were procedural, and that these statutes did not provide for a cause
of action to survive where the right was effectively extinguished by death. Procedural statutes cannot abrogate substantive interests of the survivor.

JOINT ACCOUNTS

In In re Rogan's Estate 2 the balance in decedent's checking account was
transferred from an account in his name to one in the names of decedent and
his daughter-in-law. Subsequent to decedent's death the balance was withdrawn
by the daughter-in-law. Upon a petition and citation by decedent's executor, a
preliminary objection was made that the orphans' court had no jurisdiction over
the matter. The supreme court, in affirming the orphans' court's dismissal of the
preliminary objection, held that the Orphans' Court Act of 1951, as amended, "
enlarged the jurisdiction of that court in that it conferred upon it the authority
to determine title to personalty where the personalty was registered in the name
58 365 Pa. 480, 76 A.2d 201 (1950).
59 395 Pa. 305, 149 A.2d 444 (1959).
60 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 11 (1807).
61 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.601 (1949).
62 390 Pa. 137, 145 A.2d 530 (1958).
63 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2080.301 (1951).
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of the decedent or his nominee or where the personal representative alleged that
decedent possessed the personalty at the time of his death. In construing the
word "registered," the court stated that the legislative intent was to include
personalty in the name of the decedent at the time of his death, whether in his
name alone or in the names of other persons and/or the decedent. The court
refused to restrict its meaning to those types of personalty where actual "registration" occurs, i.e. motor vehicles and securities.
In Stangi v. Stang1 4 the supreme court affirmed its view that where a joint
savings account is opened in the name of depositor and another "as joint tenants
with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common," and a signature card
so stating is executed by both parties, these facts are prima facie evidence of a
gift inter vivos by the depositor to the other and of the creation of a joint tenancy
with right of survivorship. However, a deposit accompanied by such a writing
and nothing more is so incomplete as to permit the admissibility of parol evidence. The requirement that such evidence, in order to prevail, must be clear,
precise and indubitable was fully met by testimony of the recipient of the alleged
gift that no gift was intended.

AIR CARRIER'S LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE

In Melnick v. Nat'l Air Lines 65 it was held that the limits of an air carrier's
liability for loss of luggage are determined under Federal law,66 which upholds
that limit even where the carrier is negligent. The common law rule that a
common carrier may not contract to relieve itself from liability for the consequences of its own negligence is no longer applicable to air carriers.

EMINENT DOMAIN

In Waugh v. Commonwealth 6 the supreme court affirmed the "Whitcomb
Rule," 6 which states in an eminent domain case where an award of detention
money is proper that the rate will be the normal commercial interest rate during
the period of detention, but in the absence of any evidence of the normal commercial rate of interest during the period of detention, a presumption arises that
such rate is the legal rate of six percent (6%). The superior court in Tresen v.
GeneralState Authority 6 refused to follow condemnee's contention that under
64394 Pa. 156, 146 A.2d 303 (1958).
65 189 Pa. Super. 316, 150 A.2d 566 (1959).
66 CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT, 52 STAT. 980; 49 U.S.C.A. 401 et seq. (1938).

394 Pa. 166, 146 A.2d 297 (1958).
68 Whitcomb v. City of Philadelphia, 264 Pa. 277, 107 Atl. 765 (1919).
,154 A.2d 325 (1959).
69Pa. Super. 67
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the General State Authority Act 7"it was entitled to six percent (6%c) interest
as just compensation in addition to detention money.
In answering landowner's argument that there can be no compromise of
damages for condemnation where the figures alleged by both sides are based
upon two incompatible sets of fundamental assumptions, the court in Harmony
Realty Co. v. Commonwealth "' held that the jury is not bound to accept either
plaintiff's or defendant's figures in arriving at a just sum in condemnation cases,
and that an amount between the two extremes is not a compromise but an ascertainment of fact.
Schuster v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n 2 held that the interest in the
right of use of the surface necessarily incident to a grant of a right of removal
of coal from beneath that surface was such a property right that its condemnation
was compensable.
In considering the element of severance damages the supreme court, in
In re Elgart'sAppeal, 3 refused to apply the "unity of use" doctrine where the
properties are contiguous.
In In re Widening of State Highway Route No. 199 " the Commonwealth
entered a timely appeal from an award of viewers to the court of quarter sessions
rather than to the court of common pleas as prescribed by the Act of 1945." 3
Although the time during which an appeal could be made had expired, the
Commonwealth was allowed leave to have the appeal certified to the proper
court nunc pro tunc on the basis that the law favors the right of appeal and the
fact that the landowner neither alleged nor demonstrated that any prejudicial
harm had occurred.
In Dyer v. Commonwealth,7" subsequent to the Commonwealth's condemnation, the landowner removed a building thereon to a portion of his uncondemned property. In refusing the Commonwealth's contention that the measure
of damages should be the difference in value of the entire property before the
condemnation, including the building, and the value of the remaining tract after
the condemnation, including the relocated building, the court held that the true
rule for establishing the measure of damages was the difference between the
70

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1707.12 (1949).

71 394 Pa. 65, 145 A.2d-541 (1958).
72 395 Pa. 441, 149 A.2d 447 (1959).

73395 Pa. 343, 149 A.2d 641 (1959).
190 Pa. Super. 11, 151 A.2d 805 (1959).
75 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 670-303 (1945).
76 396 Pa. 524, 152 A.2d 760 (1959).
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value of the land immediately before the taking and the value of the land
immediately after the taking, as affected by the taking. The court stated that
the Commonwealth would have to seek recoupment through another form of
action for the value of the building removed by landowner.
NABORS

